I. INTRODUCTION
Along the way of life, someone must have sense enough and morality enough to cut off the chain of hate and evil. The greatest way to do that is through love. I believe firmly that love is a transforming power that can lift a whole community to new horizons of fair play, goodwill, and justice. 2 For many lawyers, Martin Luther King, Jr. is a powerful symbol. His life inspires lawyers to believe in the possibility of monumental legal change through community mobilization; consider his work on the Montgomery bus boycott. 3 His oratory inspires lawyers to believe in the possibility of monumental legal change through persuasion; consider how often Dr. King's I Have a Dream speech is quoted. 4 Lawyers use Dr. King's speeches and sayings as a way of calling forth a narrative about how legal structures (among others) in this country were made to acknowledge a more legitimate sense of equality. 5 Lawyers also look to Dr. King as a model advocate -a zealous and loyal representative of his underserved and underrepresented community. 6 Dr. King, himself, recognized the importance of persuasion by lawyers. In his autobiography, he recounts his arrest in 1960, as the lunch counter sit-in movement intensified, for falsifying state income tax returns. 7 He was defended by William Ming and Huber Delaney -two AfricanAmerican lawyers from the North. 8 Dr. King knew the criminal charges were illegitimate and an attempt by the "white Southern power structure" to derail his civil rights work. 9 About the efforts of his lawyers, Dr. King recalled:
They [Ming and Delaney] brought to the courtroom wisdom, courage, and a highly developed art of advocacy... I am frank to confess that on this occasion I learned that truth and conviction in the hands of a skillful advocate could make what started out as a bigoted, prejudiced jury, choose the path ofjustice. 10 Dr. King was acquitted." Dr. King, the advocate, knew the power of persuasion, not only by his own work, but also by the work of lawyers around him.
For lawyers, then, looking at Martin Luther King, Jr. -in particular, Dr. King the advocate -his portrait fits smoothly into the contours of what many of us would expect of a socially-activist lawyer. Thus, it is easy for us to look to Dr. King as a model for what socially-engaged lawyering might look like. How might that model change if we consider Dr. King not in an advocacy role, but in his role as a preacher?
King gave primacy to his role as a preacher. As he said upon his installation in 1954 as minister at the Dexter Avenue Church in Montgomery: "I come to you with only the claim of being a servant of Christ, and a feeling of dependence on his grace for my leadership. I come with a feeling that I have been called to preach and to lead God's people."' 2 Similarly, after the first day of the Montgomery bus boycott, for which organizers had hoped for 60% participation, and which had garnered almost 100% participation of the Black community, 3 Dr. King was asked to speak to the community gathered that night at Holt Street Church. 4 With little time to draft his remarks, Dr. King spoke without notes, proclaiming his now well-known statement: "And we are not wrong. We are not wrong in what we are doing. If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong. If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong."' 5 King's remarks had "evoked more response than any speech or sermon [he] had ever delivered, and yet it was virtually unprepared.' 6 King credited his ability so strongly to evoke and capture the sentiment that night not to his commitment to civil rights or his capacity as an orator, but to his calling as a preacher. 7 If for Dr. King, then, his ministry was the primary wellspring for the way in which he approached his advocacy, what did that mean for Dr. King? Further, what does it mean for lawyers today who look to Dr. King as an inspirational model for their own lawyerly advocacy? As the opening quote of this article makes clear," Dr. King relied on the principle of love and its resulting requirement of nonviolence. Acknowledging that love and nonviolence might be challenging commitments to be asked from the greater Black community, Dr. King took great care in delineating what he meant by love. 19 He articulated many times that his theory of love is not a weak, passive love. It is love in action .... [It] is love seeking to preserve and create community. It is insistence on community even when one seeks to break it ....
In the final analysis, agape [Greek for love] means a recognition of the fact that all life is interrelated. All humanity is involved in a single process, and all men are brothers. 2°D r. King believed that his practice based on love in action could bring about legal change, just as it could bring about social change. 2 bus segregation law change in Montgomery. He saw the change in lunch counter segregation in Birmingham. 2 3 He saw the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 He also saw and experienced innumerable ways in which the law may be used illegitimately: a Montgomery jury refusing to convict seven white defendants on charges related to bombings, 25 his myriad arrests designed to curtail his advocacy, 26 and injunctions entered to stop lunch counter sit-ins. 2 7 Dr. King, the preacher, was called by his faith to commit to love in action, and Dr. King, the advocate, demonstrated its power to effect legal and social change.
Fast forward forty-five years to contemporary time. Imagine an annual meeting of the Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar Association -a group whose membership is comprised of lawyers 36 years or younger, or who have practiced five years or less. 2 To the assembled group of lawyers, almost all of whom were born after Dr. King was assassinated, the keynote speaker talks about his hopes for the ways in which the young lawyers will practice law. The speaker counsels, " [Love] says you must go on with wise restraint and calm reasonableness but you must keep moving., 29 After acknowledging that the law can be a way in which society permits a kind of violence to be played out between individuals, entities, communities, and governments," the speaker then further counsels, ". . . nonviolence in the truest sense is not a strategy that one uses simply because it is expedient at the moment; nonviolence is ultimately a way of life that men live by because of the sheer morality of its claim." 31 How would such a speech be responded to by the assembled young lawyers? Could those young lawyers embrace the message of Dr. King, the preacher, in the same way they might be willing to embrace Dr. King, the iconic civil rights advocate?
This article takes up those questions. In Part II, it sketches the contours of the historic tension in the legal profession between a perceived set of professional values and other value sets, particularly those based on 22 religion. 32 Using the life of Dr. King and his theory of love in action, the article then argues that to understand the advocacy lessons of Dr. King, 33 the preacher, lawyers must set aside any generalized discomfort about religious values, and must instead look to particularized values and the effect on legal advocacy of those values in action. 34 Understanding Dr. King's theory of love in action to consider not just relationships between individuals, but also relationships between strangers or between estranged communities, the article considers Dr. King's love in action as a variation of the Biblical commandment of love of neighbor. 3 5 The article assesses whether the actions required by love of neighbor are consistent with actions required by legal professional values. 36 The article then makes a further unique contribution by considering love of neighbor across multiple faith traditions -Christian, Jewish, and Buddhist. 37 The article concludes lawyers should be as inspired by Dr. King, the preacher, as they are by Dr. King, the extraordinary orator and creator of legal change. 38 The preacher's call for love in action provides a set of advocacy skills deeply consistent with, and encouraging of, the ways in which the profession calls on, and inspires, its lawyers to practice.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF REFLECTION
In order to consider the possibility of lawyers being inspired by Dr. King's call for love in action, one must first acknowledge the legal profession's unease with religious values.
3 9 That unease is not new, and legal scholars have reflected on the place of faith in lawyering for some 32 
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time. 40 That scholarship has laid out parameters that are useful to overview before considering whether lawyers are able to use Dr. King, the preacher, as a teacher of lawyerly practice. One might envision the existent scholarship as a kind of call and response. The call comes from lawyers and scholars who articulate a traditional view of the lawyer as partisan for client without accountability for the client's moral choices, and with faith as a suspect motivator. The response comes from another group of lawyers and scholars who posit the lawyer to be in morally engaged relationship with a client, informed by the lawyer's faith, and also by a client's faith, if present.
A. THE CALL
The view of lawyering reflected by the call is a longstanding onewhat Bill Simon has labeled the "Dominant View" of lawyering in the United States. 41 It understands our adversary system of adjudication to demand that actors in the system (lawyers, judges, disputants) conform their behaviors to their assigned roles within the system. 4 2 The roles of lawyers and disputants, in particular, are articulated in ways intended to effectuate core liberal concepts of personal autonomy and freedom of thought. 4 3 Under the Dominant View, the adversary system is based on three assumptions." First, that the disputants likely each have access to differing pools of information relevant to the dispute, and have differing points of view as to what an accurate, fair, or just result would be. Second, that the most effective way to develop a full and accurate accounting of the underlying facts and law of a dispute is to have an ardent presenter for each side. Third, that a neutral arbiter (the judge) can take the competing presentations and from them determine an accurate/fair/just result. Based on those assumptions, and mindful of personal autonomy and freedom of thought, the adversary system derives the roles of disputant, lawyer, and judge. 4 5 The disputant is the one whose autonomy and freedom of thought are to be secured. 46 The lawyer is the translator and presenter for the disputant within the processes of the adversary system. 4 7 In order to preserve the disputant's autonomy and freedom of thought, the lawyer owes the disputant a duty of loyalty to accurately translate the dispute into terms appropriate to be presented within the adversary system, and must then advocate the disputant's point of view vigorously. Under the Dominant View, the lawyer violates the disputant's autonomy and freedom of thought if the lawyer imposes her own substantive moral judgments when translating or presenting the disputant's case. 8 In exchange for not engaging her own moral judgments, the lawyer is not held accountable by the adversary system for the disputant's immoral choices.
There are varied descriptions of why and how a lawyer in the adversary system is to preserve disputant autonomy and freedom of thought. The most basic is to describe the lawyer-disputant relationship as one of agent and principal. 4 9 Under the doctrine of agency law, the lawyer is subordinate to the disputant-principal, and takes instruction from the principal. 5 " By relying on an agency relationship, the disputant is the lead decision-maker, and thus is presumed to be motivated to keep her own interests at the fore. 5 The lawyer, as agent, is not permitted to trump the disputant's directives. 2 46. Id 47. Id 48. Here, I am distinguishing between judgments about procedure or strategy from moral judgments about the merits of the underlying dispute or about the disputant's motivation. For example, the Dominant View expects the lawyer to give advice to the disputant that it would be better to file the lawsuit in state court rather than federal court, or that the complaint should include causes of action in both contract and tort. The Dominant View prohibits the lawyer from making moral judgments about the merits of the underlying dispute or about the disputant's motivation. For example, refusing to raise a statute of limitations defense in a case in which the disputant agrees she is liable. The agency descriptive has been criticized by ethics scholars, who reject it as factually simplistic. 53 The descriptive presumes the power dynamic between lawyer and disputant is in favor of the disputant. However, as an empirical matter, the dynamic generally is the opposite, except in those cases in which the disputant is well-resourced and a legal sophisticate (such as a corporate client). 54 Thus, scholars argue that the agency relationship is more often turned on its head with lawyer as principal and disputant/client as agent. 55 In an effort to better preserve a disputant-client's autonomy, scholars have offered another descriptive -client-centered lawyering. 56 The clientcentered approach is as much prescriptive as descriptive in that it instructs a lawyer to be aware of the power imbalance between attorney and client and prescribes the ways in which a lawyer should act in order to preserve client/disputant autonomy. 57 Under a client-centered approach, the lawyer actively engages the client in the relationship so that the client is equally involved in identifying, describing and categorizing her problem -both as legal and as non-legal matters. 58 The lawyer remains neutral as to the client's goals and choices as a way of ensuring the client retains her autonomy and freedom of thought. 59 In essence, the client-centered model prescribes lawyerly conduct so that the lawyer truly remains the agent of the client/principal.
Critical to the concept of client-centered lawyering is the idea that a client may conceptualize her problem along many different dimensions. She might see her problem as one of tangled relationships, or of economic disadvantage, or of legal right, or of moral right. 6 " The lawyer facilitates the client's work, but does not intercede in it and does not offer the lawyer's own view on any of the dimensions. In other words, the lawyer remains neutral as to the way the client conceptualizes her problems, including the moral or ethical choices the client makes. 6 " When a client reaches a decision about a course of conduct (only some of which may require the lawyer's skills), it is the lawyer's job to move forward in service of the client's decision. In that way, the lawyer best preserves client autonomy and freedom of thought.
Defending client-centered lawyering, Norm Spaulding has hypothesized a set of challenges facing lawyers who are to be in service of their clients, but who also bring self interests to the representation. 62 As Spaulding articulates the issue, the Dominant View of lawyering designs the role of lawyer to meet institutional needs of the adversary system, but lawyers are motivated to shape that role to meet their own interests. 63 For Spaulding, the more the lawyer's self-interest is engaged by representing the client (in Spaulding's terminology "thick identity"), 6 ' the more likely it is that the lawyer will use the representation to serve her own self-interests rather than the client's. 65 Spaulding understands self-interest to include economic interests (getting paid a high fee) and non-economic interests (believing a client's goal is morally right). 66 Thus, thick identification distorts the attorney client relationship in a way that diminishes client autonomy. 67 Most relevant for this article, under Spaulding's model, thick identity constrains the legal profession's ability to honor value pluralism. A lawyer who thickly identifies with a client's values will go overboard for that client, while a lawyer who cannot identify with a client's values, will refuse to represent the client. 68 Thus, the kind of values put in play to the adversary system, and the degree to which those values are argued for, are derived from the limited set of values represented by members of the legal 60. See profession, not the larger set represented by the public at large. 9 According to Spaulding, it is only through thin identity leading to true client-centered lawyering, that value pluralism is protected. 7 " For Spaulding, there is no possibility of unproblematic thick identity. 7 From the above description of the Dominant View of lawyering it is straightforward to discern that the Dominant View mistrusts lawyers who look to religious values for guidance about how to lawyer. 72 The critique is a respectful one, but nonetheless, an ardent one that uniformly counsels lawyers to separate religious faith from lawyering. 7 3 A lawyer's religious values are understood to be, at best, irrelevant, to a lawyer's job to serve client autonomy and client freedom of thought. At worst, religious values create a thick identity problem -they cause a lawyer to either overly engage or overly disengage with a client. Even if a client were to raise religiously-based concerns, or articulate her problem in religious terms, the lawyer should do nothing more than acknowledge the client's concerns and encourage the client to make her own decisions about the place of religion in solving her problem. 74 Sandy In the end, Levinson's portrait is one of conflict in which a Jewish lawyer's faith will cause her to behave unprofessionally -either because she will be unable to do what her client asks her to do, or because she will dominate her client and force her client to act in a particular way.
3 One understands Levinson's portrait to teach that faith does not help a lawyer better serve her client, it presents only difficult obstacles that entice a lawyer to behave in domineering or dismissive ways that trump a client's autonomy and freedom of thought.
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Martha Minow has been similarly skeptical about lawyers bringing religious values to bear in their practice.
5 Like Levinson, she raises the spectre of improperly-bounded lawyering.
86
Looking at Christianity, Minow worries that its focus on reconciliation would cause Christian lawyers to avoid the confrontation she understands is required by the adversary system. 87 As she articulates it: 
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If all lawyers followed this search for conciliation, instead of pressing adversarial interests and adverse rights, I confess I would worry. I would worry about so truncated a range of lawyering styles for a client who seeks to vindicate a right, not reconcile with an opponent, or whose sense of violation would be compounded, not assisted, by efforts to seek reconciliation. I would worry about the lawyer who is so intent on conciliation that he or she does not explore with the client all the litigation options. I would be concerned for those who do not share the lawyer's religious views. And I would be concerned for an adversary system predicated on competitive fact-finding and argument. The system will not work if the lawyers appearing in court curtail the arguments available to them in an effort to promote reconciliation between the opposing parties. 88 Minow accepts the standard justifications of the Dominant View -the supremacy of client autonomy and freedom of thought. 89 Thus, she perceives that a lawyer who imbues her practice with faith-based values will not provide the full range of lawyering skills to her client, and that the lawyer might dominate her client and trump client autonomy. 9° For Minow, there does not appear to be any possibility that a lawyer could use faith-based values in service to a client. 91 In addition to concerns about truncated or dominating lawyering, Minow adds another concern: that the language of faith is unfit to be used when lawyering in a public arena. 9 2 Affirming the Rawlsian idea of public reason, 93 she argues that "reasons used in political discussion must be accessible to the comprehension, scrutiny, and response of those who do not share the speaker's religious convictions. Otherwise, the prospects for open and reasoned debate diminish potentially irreparably., 94 Under Minow's vision of public reason, conversations from faith-based values are not easily translated either across religions or from a religious to a secular setting. 95 Rather than considering positive possibilities of efforts to translate across faiths or between faith and the secular, she argues that public arena conversations must be based in purely secular terms. Levinson and Minow are not the only scholars or lawyers who are leery of lawyers bringing faith-based values into their professional work, but they are exemplary of the critique.
9 7 The Dominant View presumes only two kinds of lawyers, those who remain neutral towards their clients, but who avidly pursue their client's objective, and those who cannot remain neutral towards their clients, and who disturb client autonomy with bad consequences. 98 It is a view that expects the worst of lawyers, what Thomas Shaffer has called the bad man theory of lawyering. 99 In its extraordinary concern for the bad-man lawyer, the Dominant View looks to the worst behavior. By always describing the worst behavior, the Dominant View reinforces the notion that any behavior by a lawyer that is other than neutral disconnectedness is bad.'°B . THE RESPONSE." 100. I want to emphasize that I am not arguing there are no hard cases for a lawyer who considers faith-based values. Of course there are, and they are troublesome for the very reasons articulated by the Dominant View. My argument is that hard cases are not the only kind of cases that come about when a lawyer considers his or her faith tradition.
101. Here I will focus on the response to the Dominant View from the Religious Lawyering Movement. There has also been a sustained critical response from a secular perspective which challenges the Dominant View's requirements that lawyers be loyal, partisan advocates who unengaged with, and not accountable for, their client's moral choices. Thomas Shaffer, who has offered an ardent and sustained accounting of how his religious faith demands that he behave as a lawyer. 1 1 2 Shaffer's account is personal as well as theoretical, drawing from his experiences as a lawyer and the personal stories of others." 3 Shaffer's consistent message is that lawyers of Christian faith (Shaffer speaks from his own Catholic tradition) are necessarily situated first within their religious communities (just as all persons are necessarily situated first within some primary community)."° From those communities, lawyers (and others) discern their moral obligations." 5 For the Christian lawyer, "[t]he goal and purpose of a virtuous life in a profession is to help others become good persons ...
. ""'
In part through use of personal experience, Shaffer crafts an extended narrative that pushes for space in the existing narrative of the Dominant View of lawyering. Where the Dominant View insists on lawyers who are disengaged, and presumes the worst of both lawyers and clients (each of whom will act as bad men), Shaffer insists on a contrary view. One in which he, and other Christian lawyers, are deeply engaged with their clients, which presumes each to have the capacity for mutual moral conversation, and which leads to beneficial results. 'l Like Shaffer, Pearce has responded to the Dominant View in part with a personal narrative as a way of claiming space in the conversation about ethical lawyering. As Pearce and Amelia Uelmen have noted, the initial call and response between the Dominant View and the Religious Lawyering Movement has been about whether or not. 2 In other words, the call of the Dominant View saying "Lawyer, do not bring personal values like religion to bear in your lawyering," and the Religious Lawyering Movement responding, "Lawyer, do so." The call and response continue," 3 and will do so as long as the starting proposition is the dichotomy of whether or not.
Nonetheless, the second wave of the Religious Lawyering Movement has moved beyond the dichotomy "to assume that there should be space for lawyers to bring their religious values into their professional work, and thus focuses on more concrete and complex explorations of how to work as a religious lawyer."' 4 The move to how reflects a core commitment to integrating thought and action. Recall Pearce's comment that study and prayer must join with conduct." 5 As philosopher Lenn E. Goodman has described it: "[M]ere study and devotion, prayer and meditation, are unfulfilled and unfulfilling without active engagement in behalf of our (2004 The move of the second wave of the Religious Lawyering Movement to the how is similar to Dr. King's move to direct action. It reminds lawyers and scholars that a dichotomous conversation often cannot resolve -either into previously unrecognized agreement or into a confirmation of disagreement -without a move to direct action.' 9 In the case of religious values and lawyering, the move to direct action requires taking a common religious value and specifically applying it to lawyering conduct.
Taking Dr. King's call for love in action, this article now considers how to translate that into a common religious value that is held across several religious traditions, which can then be tested in specific lawyering settings.
III. LOVE OFNEIGHBOR AS AN EXAMPLE OF LOVE INACTION
As noted earlier, Dr. King was well aware that his call for love in action might be misunderstood or met skeptically by many in the Black community. 2° Over the course of his career as a preacher and civil rights activist, he returned regularly to the topic of what love in action required. ' 2 ' First, he clarified he was not speaking about a sentimental emotion. 12 2 Instead, he was speaking about "understanding, a redeeming good will for 116. LENN E. GOODMAN 122. See id. at 8. [Vol. 22 all men, an overflowing love which seeks nothing in return."' 12 3 Further, love in action required a specific intent. As Dr. King described it, "nonviolent resistance is also an internal matter. It not only avoids external violence or external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit."' 12 4 Finally, love in action, as the phrase makes clear, requires action. Dr. King's experience on the bus boycott in Montgomery was seminal for him in that regard. Of the boycott, he said:
The experience in Montgomery did more to clarify my thinking on the question of nonviolence than all of the books that I had read. As the days unfolded I became more and more convinced of the power of nonviolence. Living through the actual experience of the protest, nonviolence became more than a method to which I gave intellectual assent; it became a commitment to a way of life. Many issues I had not cleared up intellectually concerning nonviolence were now solved in the sphere of practical action.' 25 Dr. King also noted the critical influence on him of Gandhi, saying: Prior to reading Gandhi, I had about concluded that the ethics of Jesus were only effective in individual relationships. The "turn the other cheek" philosophy and the "love your enemies" philosophy were only valid, I felt, when individuals were in conflict with other individuals; when racial groups and nations were in conflict a more realistic approach seemed necessary.126
Gandhi's approach helped Dr. King to clarify the causal relationship that exists between practicing love in action towards an individual and the ultimate goal of creating a shared community (or "beloved community" in Dr. King's words). It was other-regarding and universal. In other words, it called for good will towards all, without expectation of return. 29 It also required a specific internal intent, and was not limited to external conduct. 30 Leviticus, the third Book of the Bible. 3 ' The relevant verse reads: "Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself... .""' Of course, Dr. King was-trained in a Christian religious tradition, thus well-versed with Leviticus. Presumably, he understood love of neighbor to be related to his call for love in action. But, to ensure that others in Christian traditions would concur, it will be helpful to look at perspectives from additional Christian writers, particularly those who write about Christianity as it relates to lawyering.
Furthermore, because this article has as one of its goals the examination of a religious value that is shared across multiple faith traditions, it must also consider whether the concept of love of neighbor translates beyond Christianity. The article considers two additional faith traditions: Judaism and Buddhism. The Book of Leviticus is text shared by Judaism and Christianity, but is not a part of Buddhist canon. 3 4 Thus, before presuming that love of neighbor is a religious value that one may productively apply to specific lawyerly conduct, it is important to consider whether it is possible to consider a concept across faiths in which a canonical text is not shared.
A. THE POSSIBILITY OF SHARING CONCEPTS ACROSS FAITHS
For there to be a fruitful possibility of sharing concepts across faiths, there must be a willingness of participants to connect with, and establish contact across, differing faith traditions. Stating the obvious, interfaith dialogue is hard.' 35 It is hard because of histories of tension between faith traditions.' 36 It is hard because religions do not necessarily share common languages or narratives. 137 It is hard in the context of religious conversation and the legal profession because of the Dominant View's commitment to the liberal idea of public reason that lawyering is a sufficiently public 59 Those looking to talk about and compare texts need to first look at whether the texts present language translation issues.
6° If the texts do, then the conversants need to learn about the possible translations and settle on a mutual set of understandings about the meaning of the material textual words on which their conversation will focus.' 6 Potentially more challenging than language translation issues are translation issues dealing with the concept itself (although the two kinds of translation issues may be intertwined).' 6 2 For example, as noted above, Buddhist texts do not have the phrase love thy neighbor. 63 The translation that needs to occur, then, is at a conceptual level. For example, does love of neighbor in the Christian and Jewish faiths encompass certain kinds of conduct? Does it encompass a specific intention? Is intent or conduct more important? How much overlap is there between the conceptual contours of the particular shared text in Judaism and Christianity?
Once one has determined the conceptual contours derived from the text of Leviticus, one must consider whether Buddhism includes similar conceptual contours.' 64 The article will return to that particular conceptual translation issue shortly 165 and will consider the contours of love of neighbor in Judaism and Christianity, 1 6 6 and whether there is a Buddhist translation. ' 67 First, consider one more translation issue -that there is sufficient consensus within a particular religion about certain concepts to make it productive to converse across religions. For example, most Buddhist scholars consider there to be three main movements of Buddhism -Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana -each of which has numerous schools within it. 169 All of the movements follow the teachings of Buddha, but through varying texts. 170 As with other religions, the teachings of the Buddha were first transmitted orally. 7 ' Scholars believe Buddha spoke in an Indian dialect,' 72 but he encouraged monks to teach in their own dialects.' 73 Thus, Buddhist oral traditions are broad.' 74 After the Buddha's death, written transcriptions began to appear, and likely developed over the course of five to six centuries.' 75 The Theravadan Movement relies on a transcription in Pali, called the Pali Canon, which the Movement understands to be a direct translation of Buddha's oral teachings. 7 6 The Mahayanist School acknowledges the Pali Canon, but also adds other transcriptions often written in Sanskrit. 177 The schools within the three main movements of Buddhism often vary by the way in which each will highlight a certain doctrine or concept, much like schools within Judaism or Christianity."' Buddhism, like Judaism and Christianity, is not homogenous or monolithic. 179 Thus, there is fertile conversation to be had within a single faith tradition. As Religious Lawyering scholars have noted, one important facet of a lawyer's own specific faith community is that it provides the lawyer with a supportive and similarly-situated group in which to discern how to 168 Lesnick discovered his engagement in faiths other than his own allowed him to view his own tradition in a renewed way. 188 It also revealed to him "the profound commonalities" between Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism. 89 Russ Pearce describes an uncomfortable discovery of anti-Semitism by noted social justice advocate, and theologian, William Stringfellow. 9°I n preparing for a conference to honor the legacy of Stringfellow, Pearce came across Stringfellow's 1963 remarks at a conference on religion and race where, in speaking about unity among men, Stringfellow insisted "[t]he issue is baptism" -a remark which participants found offensive as suggesting that Jewish colleagues, as the unbaptized, were outsiders."' Acknowledging Stringfellow's remark was anti-Semitic, Pearce takes up the challenge of interfaith conversation to look further at Stringfellow's 
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writing and legal career. 192 From those he builds a portrait of Stringfellow as a lawyer committed to a vocation of helping the poor, underserved, and underrepresented.' 93 Pearce then looks to his Jewish faith and notes a Jewish lawyer "might very well arrive at the same answer as William Stringfellow" as to the lawyer's vocation to serve the poor and underrepresented.' 9 4 Pearce does not in any way excuse Stringfellow's anti-Semitism, but uses it as a way of demonstrating how interfaith conversation can happen despite "discovering hurtful differences."' 95 The stories of Lesnick and Pearce are exemplary of the possibilities of productive interfaith conversations, while also foregrounding its difficulties. Building on the possibility of productive conversation, the article sketches out possible contours of love of neighbor in each religious tradition, considering there are common themes. 1 96 Mindful of the fact that faith traditions are not uniform, the article offers the descriptions as one set of possibilities coming from each tradition, not as the definitive set. 97 
C. A CHRISTIAN VIEW OF LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
Thomas Shaffer has articulated a responsibility for lawyers to take a "risk of openness."' 98 While not using the phrase love of neighbor, Not a substance.' ' ' 0 2 As a consequence of being open to the client, the relationship between lawyer and client, with lawyer representing client, involves the "acceptance of the principle (and of the fact) that even in 'representation' it is not only an argument or interest being asserted, but a person and a relationship being not asserted, but lived., 2 0 3 Shaffer calls for a particular intent from lawyers, which in turn, drives actions. 2°4 Understanding Shaffer's call for openness as consonant with love of neighbor, the requisite intent of love of neighbor would include receptivity, compassion, discovery, and commitment, while disavowing domination, manipulation, presumptiveness, and disengagement.
Amelia Uelman has also considered the intentionality called for by love of neighbor. 2 5 In looking at the possible tension for a Catholic between a commitment to dialogue and the Catholic Church's evangelizing mission, Uelman has drawn on love of neighbor as a way of navigating both provisions. 0 6 Uelman consults papal writings to consider what characteristics are called for by the notion of Christ's love, and thus, the characteristics to strive for in love of neighbor. 2 07 Resonating with Shaffer's idea of openness, Uelman identifies love as self-emptying, the letting go of individual attachments so that one might "make himself everything to everyone.
' '
Further, love is universal, "it means loving everyone." 209 It is concrete; it requires intent and "practical commitment," such as "concern, tenderness, compassion, openness, availability and interest in people's problems. 21 0 Both Shaffer and Uelman describe certain intentions required by love of neighbor. 21 First, they describe an "openness" or "self-emptying," an intent to set aside self-interest or self-involvement. 2 Next "trust" or "universality," an intent to be receptive to another regardless of the characteristics or conduct of the other. 21 3 Finally, an intent to do, engaging in conduct to demonstrate openness and universality.
D. A JEWISH VIEW OF LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
Professor Samuel Levine has written extensively on the ways in which Jewish law might inform ethical lawyering. 21 5 He has indentified love of neighbor as an important general principle in Jewish law that may "be applied to govern situations not delineated in the Torah." ' 1 6 As Levine notes, Jewish scholars have delineated some of the specific conduct required by love of neighbor, such as visiting the sick, but the delineations are exemplary, not exclusive. 2 7 Thus, love of neighbor stands as an ongoing source of existing, but "unenumerated" precepts28 It not only guides extraordinary circumstances, it guides daily and mundane actions, which, in some ways, are more important . 9 But love of neighbor calls for a particular intentionality as well, as philosopher Lenn Goodman has detailed.
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For Goodman, love of neighbor starts by acknowledging that individuals can be self-interested and egotistical and it then calls on a person to realize that another's interest must be equally acknowledged. 22 Goodman reminds us the appropriate translation of neighbor from Hebrew to English includes the idea of a stranger, so the command of love of neighbor is an inclusive one. 224 It is universal, to use Uelman's term. 22 5 Finally, good will is not enough. 226 Love of neighbor requires action; recall Goodman's earlier quote that "mere study and devotion, prayer and meditation, are unfulfilled and unfulfilling without active engagement in behalf of our fellow human beings. 227 That engagement need not be extravagant, it may be as simple as "fac[ing] one's interlocutor, showing not just a profile or a blank, poker face but a responsive, expressive face, evincing warmth and interest. 2 28
E. A BUDDHIST VIEW OF LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
To situate the idea of love of neighbor in Buddhism, it is useful to first describe some core Buddhist concepts. 229 As noted earlier, Buddhism does not share texts with Judaism and Christianity nor does it work from a notion of a personal "Creator-God., 2 3° Thus, if Buddhism embraces an idea of love of neighbor it starts from some place other than as a command from holy text.
In Buddha's first lecture after his enlightenment, he described the pivotal propositions of Buddhism, the Four Noble Truths. 231 "suffering"). 232 Second Noble Truth: The cause of dukkha is tanha (usually translated in English as "desire"). 233 Third Noble Truth: The end of dukkha comes by overcoming tanha.
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Fourth Noble Truth: The way of overcoming tanha is the Eightfold Path. 235 Recall that dukkha, or suffering, is captured by the idea that things are askance or dislocated; "its pivot is not true." ' 236 The reason that our lives are akimbo is that we crave permanence in a -world that is ever-changing. 237 We desire personal fulfillment, which pushes us to cling to a false sense of an individualized, separate, permanent self. 238 Once we understand that that our dislocation is caused by the "narrow limits of self-interest," we may overcome our dislocation by following the Eightfold Path.
2 39 Our destination upon overcoming dukkha and tanha is equanimity toward all, expressed through loving-kindness, compassion, and mindfulness. 24°B efore exploring the Eightfold Path, first consider the Buddha's idea of interconnectedness.
The Buddha described the interconnectedness of everything as "dependent arising" -that everything and every process arises in, and is dependent on, every other thing and process. 24 ' As a result, the world is a place webbed by interconnectedness, not a place full of individuated and separated beings and processes. As Thich Nhat Hanh has described it: "You cannot just be by yourself alone. You have to inter-be with every other thing., 2 4 2 One of Buddha's most well-known phrases, and one which repeats itself throughout Buddhist texts in all traditions is about dependent arising: "This is because that is. This is not, because that is not. This comes to be, because that comes to be. This ceases to be, because that ceases to be. All phenomena are interdependent. When we think of a speck of dust, a flower, or a human being, our thinking cannot break loose from the idea of unity, of one, of calculation. We see a line drawn between one and many, one and not one. But if we truly realize the interdependent nature of the dust, the flower, and the human being, we see that unity cannot exist without diversity. Unity and diversity interpenetrate each other freely. Unity is diversity, and diversity is unity. This is the principle of interbeing.
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Returning to the Eightfold Path then, one can understand it as a daily intentional regime designed to help one become aware of mistaken notions of self, self-interest and craving for permanence, and to become aware of, and embrace, the interconnectedness of all. The Path is not linear -one does not start at Right View, perfect it, and then move to Right Intent, and so on.
2 48 It is a "noble path of eight limbs" with each limb requiring the other and all requiring practice together. 249 For purposes of this article, it is likely most helpful to expand on one part of the Path as it is illustrative of all parts of the Path.
Consider Right Speech. Inherent in the concept are both intent and conduct. 251 The intent is to be aware of the power of words. 252 From the above, one can see the call of "love of neighbor" is easily accommodated within Buddhism. As part of one's efforts to understand and work towards interconnectedness, an intent to be other-regarding and to act with compassion towards another (i.e., love one's neighbor) is consistent with the Eightfold Path.
F. COMMONALITIES
The commonalities between Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism related to love of neighbor are captured along the same four dimensions that are present in Dr. King's love in action. 256 First, love of neighbor is other-regarding -one takes a perspective that places the interests of another on equal footing with one's own. 7 Next, it is inclusive and universalone must respond to everyone with openness and equanimity, and no particular relationship need stand above another. 258 Third, although this dimension is implicit in the first two, it requires a specific intent -one must hold the intent to be other regarding and universal. 2 59 Those may not be just by-products of self-interest (i.e., It is not "I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine."). Finally, it requires action -one must engage in the world, from mundane actions onward. 2 6 1 It is not enough to passively respond to other's conduct. 26 1 Having found that Dr. King's love in action could also be understood as love of neighbor, and that such a concept is shared across religious traditions, the next step is to apply the concept to lawyerly practice. 258. See GOODMAN, supra note 116, at 15 (stating the command of "love of neighbor" is inclusive); Reconciling Evangelization, supra note 135, at 313 (finding love "means loving everyone").
259. See KEOWN, supra note 251, at 84-87 (stating the practice "Right Speech" allows one to move beyond a sense of separated self to a sense of interconnectedness).
260. See TOH, supra note 4, at 12 (stating the intent required is a specific internal intent that is not limited to external conduct).
261. See id. at 12 (stating intent requires consistent conduct).
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IV. WHAT'S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT?
Dr. King was working in a time of notable social upheaval. 262 In his work, love in action, while it may have focused on a mundane, daily activity like riding a bus, was immediately transformed into action about broad social change. 263 For us now, the name Rosa Parks does not bring to mind an ordinary woman. 264 Rosa Parks was the woman who started desegregation in Montgomery, Alabama. 2 65 Her action was not ordinary and mundane -it was heroic. Thus, when one thinks about the context in which Dr. King was relying on love in action, one thinks of big events, not of the routine.
In contrast, for contemporary lawyers, most of their time is spent on legal tasks that are mundane and ordinary; tasks like document review, contract review, and general advice and counsel. If a contemporary lawyer's work is mostly mundane and ordinary, is love in action relevant? Dr. King would likely counsel that it is.
Dr. King understood that heroic moments had to be followed by steady, daily work in order to preserve progress. 266 Some eleven years after Rosa Parks refused to give up her bus seat, with the struggle for civil rights still at hand, Dr. King remarked: "The answer was only to be found in persistent trying, perpetual experimentation, persevering togetherness. 267 Through his work he had discovered that the potency of a march or protest did not last without daily, follow-up efforts. 268 Thus, when he began a civil rights campaign in Chicago with a rally at Soldier's Field, he did not stop there. 269 He encouraged and supported tenants in their efforts to create tenant unions, which were then able to bargain collectively with local landlords. 27 ' Those tenant unions dealt with daily, mundane issues like janitorial services. 1 Love in action, then, should be as useful to a contemporary lawyer in her daily law practice, as it would be to her in any part of her practice focused on more monumental change. Because the majority of a lawyer's time is spent on the mundane, 272 this article will focus on examples of that kind of lawyerly work in applying love in action, or love of neighbor. 273 The article considers two lawyering moments: the initial meeting between lawyer and client, and a meeting at which the lawyer and client discuss a pre-filing settlement offer (i.e., an offer before a civil complaint has been filed). 274 Furthermore, the article considers the lawyering practice called for by love of neighbor in light of the Dominant View's concern about religious values causing a lawyer to disrespect client autonomy and to disrespect value pluralism. 2 75 By applying love of neighbor in the specific contexts of an initial lawyer-client meeting and a pre-filing settlement offer, the article discerns whether the move to specific application provides a way to break the logjam that exists in the more generalized conversation between the Dominant View and Religious Lawyering. 276 
A. INITIAL MEETING BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT
Assume a common case: an individual client, not an entity, and an attorney in private practice. 77 Outside of small claims actions, in which an attorney is often not present, the most common kind of civil case is a contract action. 27 " There is another reason to focus on a common case in 
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addition to the fact it is a likely and consistent practice experience for a lawyer. That reason is to challenge one of the typical features of the existing Dominant View-Religious Lawyering discourse.
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The discourse almost always presumes the uncommon case (or, the "hard case"). 280 For example, a Catholic lawyer who is asked to represent a minor girl who wishes to get an abortion without her parents' consent, and who lives in a state with a statute requiring the minor to get a court's permission for an abortion without parental consent. Focusing on a common case is not a dodge of the hard cases. The hard cases are hard. They make finding agreement hard, especially if both sides have experienced the other primarily in disagreement. Changing the focus to the everyday case, reminds us there is much more in the world of lawyerly practice than hard cases. Thus, the change in focus also allows us to see beyond the existing polarized discourse to discover possible areas of agreement. It gives us the potential to experience agreement in the face of a history replete with disagreement. 281 It is following Dr. King's advice to use the fact of contact to create understanding.
Consider, then, a client who contracted for a new roof and has found that the new roof leaks. How would a lawyer mindful of love of neighbor (the "LON lawyer") proceed with an initial client meeting. The lawyer may consider many simple things such as where she and the client sit -in the lawyer's office with an imposing desk between them, or in a conference room, side-by-side. Has the lawyer made sure to set aside sufficient time for the meeting, or does she announce when she comes in "I have 30 minutes before I have to be in court." Does the lawyer encourage the client to start the conversation wherever she is most comfortable, or is the lawyer directive? Does the lawyer solicit the client's hopes for outcomes in an open way or does the lawyer quickly slot facts into a possible cause of action and then announce the proposed outcome (i.e., You have a contract claim and under contract law, the kinds of damages you can get are _.) ? For each of the simple examples above, it may be likely that most lawyers would say they strive to behave as does the LON lawyer. It may be that many lawyers would also say that the LON lawyer is not doing anything differently from a conscientious, courteous lawyer. The LON lawyer would likely agree. If there is a difference it is in the constancy of the intention. In other words, the LON lawyer commits to being mindful about the mundane and simple at all turns -to acting intentionally rather than habitually. Nonetheless, the LON lawyer and the conscientious lawyer may not be dissimilar, while both may be in similar contrast to the self-involved lawyer who puts her own interests ahead of the client's.
The similarity between an LON lawyer and other conscientious lawyers is a notable response to the Dominant View's perception that the necessary result of faith-based lawyering is domination or disengagement. 282 But as the above description makes clear, the LON lawyer is actively working to engage her client as an equal, and to do so from the very beginning of the relationship. 283 It may be that the Dominant View worries that the issue is not mundane lawyerly behavior, but behavior during certain critical moments. But, the lawyer-client relationship consists of much more of the mundane than the critical. 2 84 Thus, it is in the mundane that an attorney has repeated opportunities to demonstrate her commitment to a client. 285 The LON lawyer takes the mundane seriously and imbues the mundane with possibility. An oft-heard story in Zen Buddhism is of the eager learner who wishes to dig into the Zen practice and is told to go wash dishes as the most important starting point, for if one cannot find meaning in the mundane, one cannot find it anywhere. 286 
B. PRE-FILING SETTLEMENT OFFER
What, then, of a critical moment in the representation? How might an LON lawyer act when meeting with her client to discuss a settlement offer from the roofing company, which has come in response to the lawyer's communications with the company that the client is considering filing a lawsuit If you cannot find the meaning of life in an act as routine as that of doing the dishes, you will not find it anywhere." Id.; see also LESNICK, supra note 183, at 18. When noting he was hoping to learn more about Buddhism during his summer stay at a Buddhist farm, Lesnick was told: "Great! Just go into the kitchen, and start doing the dishes!" Id.
[Vol. 22 lawyer and roofing company might have been.
The LON lawyer, being committed to universality, will have treated representatives of the roofing company with respect and courtesy. The lawyer will not have sent a blustery demand letter in which the lawyer insists on recompense in an overreaching way. The lawyer will, however, have attempted to learn the roofing company's side of the story and to have listened with a non-partisan ear. 287 It is useful to highlight listening to note that an important starting point for an LON lawyer is a multi-perspective understanding, and that such understanding may happen when one is acting on behalf of another. 88 Further, nothing about love of neighbor suggests that an LON lawyer will undermine a client's interests or goals during communications with the roofing company (recall Martha Minow's concern about truncated lawyering). 28 9 In other words, an LON lawyer will strive to understand the other side, but in doing so will not demean or dismiss her own client's interests. 2 9 " To bring the principles of love of neighbor to bear, a lawyer need not transform herself into a neutral seeking to mediate between two parties. 29 ' She honors her fiduciary commitment to her client, and her love of neighbor commitment to both parties by mindful, open, compassionate listening. 292 Coming now to the meeting of the LON lawyer and her client in which they discuss the roofing company's settlement offer. The LON lawyer will have already kept her client abreast of the conversations with the roofing company. 293 The lawyer may either know that her client may not be experienced in legal matters and may be particularly anxious about the dispute, or may know that the client is experienced, and thus may wish to have more regularized input. 294 Regardless, as noted above, the LON lawyer is mindful of the ordinary and mundane. 295 At the meeting, the LON lawyer will start with the proposition that the conversation is a mutual one, and that the client is willing, and interested in, all facets of the conversation. 296 The LON lawyer will exchange any new information from the roofing company with the client and make sure she learns of anything new from her client. 297 When discussing possible action, the LON lawyer will be transparent with her client about the lawyer's commitment to respect others, to show compassion and the like. 298 Importantly, the LON lawyer will underscore those are her commitments and that she hopes to listen to, and understand her client's own perspective on those commitments. 299 If the lawyer disagrees with the client, she will note that disagreement, but do so with tact and consideration. 3 " 0 As Lenn Goodman has described such an engagement: "We are forbidden to shame him, but tact is not silence. Love means overcoming reticence and, here, too, not standing idly by to watch another stumble. 3 1
For example, the roofing company might have set up some appointments with the client to repair the roof and the client may have failed to be at home to let the company in. The LON lawyer would raise that with the client in an honest and engaged manner -what was the client's perspective on how firm the meetings times were, on why the client was away, or on whether the company's employees would be irritated by the missed appointments? The LON lawyer would not start with a lecture the client about clean hands -signaling to the client that the lawyer is morally superior -nor start by strategizing with the client about ways to avoid the bad facts -signaling to the client that moral valence is irrelevant. 3 2
The LON lawyer would also look for shared interests between the client and the roofing company, and focus those for the client. 0 3 Thus, to the extent the settlement offer broached common ground, the LON lawyer would highlight that to try and move beyond a sense of tit for tat to shared interests. 34 Nonetheless, an LON lawyer is not categorically opposed to going forward with a lawsuit (i.e., that love of neighbor demands The point in providing another example of LON lawyering that looks to many lawyers like standard-issue good lawyering is to emphasize that lawyering from faith is not necessarily the chimera that the Dominant View understands it to be. When we move from the question of whether or not lawyers should be informed by faith to the question of how, we are able to scrutinize worries of lawyer dominance or disengagement in a more discriminating way. Thus far, love of neighbor provides an example of faith-based lawyering that rejects dominance, and rejects disengagement because of difference. 310 One can envision a circumstance in which a lawyer and her client may, after an engaged conversation, disagree about a course of conduct. For example, here the client may be very angry at the roofing company and may decide that for her it is more important to file a lawsuit, than to accept a settlement offer that she finds agreeable because she hopes that a lawsuit will embarrass the roofing company. The lawyer may disagree -either because she does not agree that embarrassment is an appropriate goal, or because she does not believe that filing a lawsuit will meet the client's hopes. Would a Dominant View lawyer and an LON lawyer behave differently with the client? This article concludes yes, but possibly not in the way predicted by the Dominant View. 312 Under the Dominant View, so long as filing a lawsuit was not frivolous and would not violate relevant court pleading rules or rules of professional conduct, 313 the lawyer should accede to the client's wishes to file the lawsuit instead of settle. 3 14 The Dominant View would put the client's autonomy ahead of the lawyer's assessments. 3 5 The Dominant View lawyer may certainly have shared her assessment with the client that filing a lawsuit might not embarrass the roofing company as the client had hoped, but the Dominant View lawyer would not press the client further. 31 6 The LON lawyer would be more engaged with her client. 317 The LON lawyer would have an explicit conversation about the client's wish to embarrass the roofing company. 3 neighbor and has learned that the neighbor, and the neighbor's friend had similar problems with the company, so the client wants to protect others. Whatever the reason, the LON lawyer's engaged conversation explicitly acknowledges the client as a moral actor, and encourages the client to attend to the moral valence of her actions. 32° By doing so, the LON lawyer is not trying to badger the client into any particular conduct, but is instead trying to create space for the Shafferian good man. 321 In the end, the decision remains the client's. The intent of an LON lawyer described above challenges the Dominant View's presumption of bad man lawyering. By cultivating LON intent, a lawyer may resist self-interested or dominating behavior. A lawyer also resists presuming a bad man client. As David Luban has noted, sometimes cognitive distortions can miscue a person's judgment, and what might appear as bad man behavior is behavior that is based on faulty cognitive processes. 322 The lawyer who is unwilling to have an explicit conversation with a client about all the bases of the client's judgment call (moral or otherwise) will be unable to differentiate between the badlymotivated client and the well-motivated client who has misperceived the situation. 323 The lawyer may wrongly assume a badly-motivated client and miss an easy opportunity to help a misperceiving client correct her cognitive errors. 324 Nonetheless, assume the roofing client decides to go forward with the lawsuit solely for sport. The client tells the lawyer she feels like toying with the roofing company because she can, and has no other reason for going forward. ("Furthermore, even if the client's value system finds nothing wrong with the tactic, that may be the result of cognitive distortions ... rather than a fundamentally different moral outlook.").
323. See LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 101, at 111.7-8. 324 . As David Luban has described it: "In cases where the client's decision results from cognitive distortion rather than a genuinely different moral code, moral acquiescence on the lawyer's part will reinforce the distortion, while moral activism may break the spell .. " Id. 325. In my experience (and, I expect, in most lawyers' experiences), such a client is exceedingly rare. In fact, in my almost twenty years of experience between corporate litigation, legal aid, and clinical work, I have never had such a client.
autonomy. 3 26 It is also the kind of client that the Dominant View believes lawyers of faith cannot respect. 327 In fact, the LON lawyer commits to respecting her client, regardless of the client's motives. What the LON lawyer does not commit to is acting as the client's representative if the client's motivations are inconsistent with the lawyer's commitment to actions in line with the principles of love of neighbor. In the roofing case, then, the LON lawyer may have a candid, respectful conversation with the client about the fact the lawyer will not be the client's attorney should she go forward with the lawsuit. 3 2 ' The conversation will be without opprobrium or ultimatums. 329 The LON lawyer will continue the conversation to go over the client's options -how the client might find another lawyer, whether the LON lawyer might recommend new counsel, whether the client wishes to reconsider, and the like.
Importantly, the client should not be surprised by the LON lawyer's decision not to represent her in the roofing suit. The LON lawyer will have been transparent throughout her interactions with the client about the lawyer's commitment to a certain kind of lawyering, and will have modeled LON lawyering behavior throughout. 330 Thus, the client will have had concrete examples of what kind of lawyer the client was working with.
33 ' Finally, the LON lawyer will have engaged the client in moral conversation in a way that ensures the client understands herself to be fully participating in the conversation. 332 The client will have maintained her sense of being the final decision-maker about her own conduct. The actions described above have not referred to any particular faith tradition because the commonalities between the three faith traditions considered in this article are very strong. 334 Thus, the LON lawyer described could come from Christianity, Judaism or Buddhism. 33 5 Furthermore, the LON lawyer would be well regarded by the legal profession as diligent, competent, and a good communicator. 336 While the Dominant View would not likely agree with the way in which the LON lawyer engaged in moral conversation nor the LON lawyer's decision not to go forward with representing the client, the Dominant View's fears of attorney domination and disengagement are unfounded. 337 The how of faith-based lawyering that one sees from love of neighbor demonstrates the importance and benefit of looking at a particular facet of faith-based lawyering.:I
D. A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE?
One point should be developed further -that LON lawyering looks very similar to good secular, humanist lawyering.
In making that comparison, the article is not implicitly arguing that LON lawyering is good lawyering because it is the same as secular lawyering. For an LON lawyer, the purpose of looking to love of neighbor as a guide is to transform. For example, a Buddhist commits herself to the Eightfold Path as a way of transforming herself, and as a way of engaging in the world so that others might see the possibility of transformation in her actions. 339 An LON lawyer's reasons for acting are different than those of a secular lawyer.
Furthermore, as Dr. King repeatedly reminded those with whom he spoke, love in action has an internal component -an intent. 3 40 Thus, LON worry about the last lawyer in town problem often focus on the challenges faced by those putting forward unpopular or controversial legal claims. See id. at 984. But, at least in the United States with its fairly robust cause lawyering community, the clients with unpopular or controversial causes may have an easier time finding a lawyer than would the hypothetical roofing client of this article. See KEVIN R. DEN DULK, CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 304 (Austin Sarat lawyering requires a specific intent. 34 ' Without the requisite intent, an LON lawyer is not meeting an essential criteria of love of neighbor. 342 For an LON lawyer, the fact that her outward behavior looks like good lawyering is insufficient. 343 The LON lawyer is also charged with cultivating intent. 3 " While it may be enough for a non-LON lawyer to outwardly behave in a certain way, an LON lawyer must do more. 345 Thus, to say that LON lawyering is good lawyering because it looks just like good secular lawyering is to misunderstand a fundamental point of LON lawyering.
E. A CRITIQUE: LOVE OF NEIGHBOR IS Too EASY AN EXAMPLE
One critique from those who are skeptical about the appropriateness of faith-based lawyering might be that love of neighbor is too easy an example. 346 In other words, love of neighbor is so capacious in the conduct it might encompass that it does not raise the possibility for lawyer domination or disengagement of which the Dominant View is concerned. 347 Love of neighbor is capacious in the sense that Samuel Levine has noted. 348 There is much specific conduct that is unenumerated, but contained within the concept of love of neighbor. 3 49 Nonetheless, love of neighbor as considered in Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism is bounded by four concrete dimensions. 35° It is other-regarding, it is inclusive and universal, it is intentional, and it requires active conduct. 35 ' Those four dimensions provide clear sorting mechanisms for conduct that is within love of neighbor and conduct without. 52 It is not the case that love of neighbor can be made to accommodate any lawyerly conduct.
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Consider again the roofing company example. In describing the initial client meeting, the article suggested that it would be inconsistent with love of neighbor for a lawyer to set aside insufficient time for the meeting. A lawyer who did so would not be other-regarding, and would likely send a message to the new client that the client's time and interests were less important than the lawyer's. 354 But, nothing in the Rules of Professional Conduct penalizes a lawyer for failing to be other-regarding in setting the initial meeting. 355 Or, consider the somewhat recent trend of bar associations and courts propounding civility codes for lawyers. 356 The civility codes usually call for lawyers to show basic courtesies to each other, the court and litigants. 357 The codes do not require a specific intent, merely conduct. 358 Thus, a lawyer, while being courteous, is free to silently think discourteous thoughts. 3 5 9 As noted above, that is not true for an LON lawyer, for whom intent is as important as outward conduct. 360 An LON lawyer fails to meet her responsibilities if her conduct is respectful, but her thoughts are not.
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As the two examples demonstrate, love of neighbor can guide lawyerly practice in a way that is different from the current professional baseline, but that need not be antithetical to that baseline.
By offering love of neighbor as an example of faith-based lawyering that is good lawyering, the article has tried to be conscientious about remaining in the particulars. 362 In order to continue to move beyond the existing dichotomous conversation, remaining in the particulars is important. It ensures that the analysis is not overbroad, while also ensuring that conclusions are not inappropriately generalized.
V. CONCLUSION
Return to the annual meeting of the Young Lawyers Division, where the audience listens to the speaker conclude his remarks about love in action as a lawyerly practice. There may have been some in the audience who will have left as soon as the speaker began investigating the interplay between lawyering and a religious value. 363 For them, the Dominant View triumphs and there can be nothing but problems when a lawyer considers a religious value when deciding how to lawyer. 364 Even if they knew the speaker's words were those of Martin Luther King, Jr., they remain unwilling to consider the lessons provided by Dr. King, the preacher. 365 Others in the audience have remained -some more from courtesy than interest; some intrigued by, but maybe skeptical of, the idea that the legal profession could be motivated by a concept such as love in action. 366 By the end of the speaker's remarks, the audience leaves the auditorium with some shared thoughts. The Dominant View of lawyering is able to conceive of only one way for a lawyer to be able to respect client autonomy and freedom of thought.
3 67 That way is for a lawyer to remain removed from her client -partisan to the client's goals, but unaccountable for the client's moral choices. There is another way to envision lawyerly practice, and that is through the unexpected lens of love in action or love of neighbor. 368 By considering lawyerly practice through that particular value, one discovers a way in which lawyer and client both may deeply and genuinely engage with each other. 369 The lawyer commits to a practice that accepts the client as she presents herself and her legal problem, but that also accepts the client as having the capacity for moral conversation. 37°T he practice further commits the lawyer to an internal intent of equanimity for all, and external action consistent with that. By the end of the remarks, the audience may have a sense that they could be as inspired by Martin Luther King, Jr., the preacher, as they are by Martin Luther King, Jr., the civil rights hero. 371 363. See supra pp. 
